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LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES: THE HEARSAY
EXCEPTION AND THE
VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITION
An increasing number of child sexual abuse cases are reported every year
in the United States.1 Increased attention has been focused on this crime
recently in light of several highly publicized allegations of child sexual
abuse.2 The extent of this social and legal problem is not known, however,
because it is grossly underreported.3 An estimated 100,000 to 500,000
American children will be molested this year.4 Alleged assaults on children
1. The American Humane Association reported 71,961 cases of child sexual abuse in
1983, the last available statistical year. This figure reflects an 852% increase over cases re-
ported in 1976. Twenty-five percent of the cases involved children under the age of five. Back-
lash Feared on Child Sex Cases, Wash. Post, Mar. 23, 1985, at A13, col. 1. Sexual abuse has
been defined as "the utilization of the child for sexual gratification or an adult's permitting
another adult to so use the child." R. GEISER, HIDDEN VICTIMS 7 (1979). It has also been
defined as "forced, pressured, or stressful sexual behavior committed on a person under the age
of 17." A. BURGESS, A. GROTH, L. HOLMSTROM, & S. SGOI, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF CHIL-
DREN & ADOLESCENTS 8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as A. BURGESS]. "Sexual activity with
children is prohibited by custom in all known societies and is illegal in every state of this
country . . . regardless of the degree or type of coercion by the adult, or accommodation by
the victim." Berliner & Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. OF
Soc. ISSUES 125, 126 (1984). For an in-depth, state-by-state analysis of criminal child sexual
abuse statutes, see Kocen & Bulkley, Analysis of Criminal Child Sex Offense Statutes, A.B.A.,
NAT'L LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND PROTECTION, CHILD SEX-
UAL ABUSE & THE LAW 1-51 (1983).
2. "Molesters cut across economic, social, ethnic and educational lines. They may be
rich or poor, well-educated or ignorant, blue-collar or white, married or single." The Child
Molester: No 'Profile,' L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1984, at § 1, col. 1.
3. The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (NCCAN) has stated that accurate
statistics for child sexual abuse may never be obtained because "it is perhaps the most easily
concealable and hidden form of child maltreatment ....... A. RUSSELL & C. TRAINOR,
TRENDS IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (a publication of the
American Humane Ass'n, Denver, Colo.); see Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of In-
trafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
133, 145 (1983) ("[o]ver one-quarter of the population of female children have experienced
sexual abuse before the age of 14 and over one-third by the age of 18," although only a "min-
ute percentage of cases ever get reported to the police").
4. As the number of reported cases grows, so does the number of false accusations. See
generally Molestation: Dilemma for Authorities, L.A. Times, July 16, 1984, at § 1, col. 1. It is
significant to note, however, that "[n]ot a single study has ever found false accusations of
sexual abuse a plausible interpretation of a substantial portion of cases." Berliner & Barbieri,
supra note 1, at 127; The Rights of Suspects, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1984, at 19 (a teacher at the
Praca Day-Care Center in New York was arrested and charged with molestation of young
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take place on playgrounds, in day-care centers, and in the family home.5
children but the grand jury decided later not to indict the teacher after hearing her testimony
and learning the negative results of a polygraph examination she voluntarily took, although
such evidence is not admissible before grand juries); see The Other Victims of Child Abuse, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 1, 1985, at 67.
5. Day-care centers from Manhattan Beach, California (see People v. Buckey, Docket
No. A750900 (filed Mar. 22, 1984)) to New York City have been investigated for suspected
child sexual abuse. Seven teachers at one California preschool have been charged with 208
counts of sexual abuse. What Price Day Care?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 10, 1984, at 19. In Califor-
nia, more than 6,000 day-care centers, preschools, and family day-care homes are licensed by
the state to care for approximately 300,000 children. Abuse in the Nursery School-A License
Is No Safety Guarantee, L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1984, § I, at 3, col. 4. It is estimated that "count-
less more" operate without state licenses. Id. Sexual abuse complaints are the "leading cause
of license revocation in family day-care operations .... " Id. A state license in California
may be revoked "for conduct by the operator of the facility which is inimical to the health,
morals, welfare or safety of. . . an individual receiving services from the home .. " CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1550(c) (West Supp. 1984). In California day-care centers, licens-
ing requirements are minimal and the centers are inspected only once every three years. L.A.
Times, supra § I, at 3, col. 4. One protective measure taken has been the requirement that
those employees who work with the children ("teachers, for example, but not cooks or garden-
ers") are fingerprinted and that "there is a check of the criminal records relating offenses
dealing with children and violence." Id. Before the complaints surfaced about the sexual
abuse that allegedly has been taking place over the last ten years at the McMartin Preschool in
Manhattan Beach, there "was never a complaint on it before," according to Anne Bersinger,
deputy director in charge of community care licensing for the state Department of Social Serv-
ices. Id. The House Select Committee on Children, Youth and Families and the Ways and
Means Subcommittee on Oversight held hearings on September 17, 1984, to examine the many
recent reports of sexual assaults on children in day-care centers. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON
CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, FAMILIES AND CHILD CARE: IMPROVING THE OP-
TIONS, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-05 (Comm. Print 1984). Statistics show 11 million children
are in day-care centers, with a growth rate of 10% annually. Child Abuse Task Force Urged,
USA Today, Sept. 18, 1984, at 7A, col. 1. Seventy percent of the children in day-care are in
unlicensed centers. Reports surface regularly of suspected child sexual abuse in day-care situa-
tions. See, e.g., Day-Care Home Operator Is Charged in Anne Arundel Child Abuse Case,
Wash. Post, Sept. 28, 1984, at B8, col. 2 (an operator of a home day-care program, registered
with the county Department of Social Services, charged with sexually abusing a five-year-old
girl in her care; an aide at Early Learning, Inc. charged with the sexual assault of a child
attending the facility); Guilt Haunts Molested Kids' Parents, USA Today, Sept. 17, 1984, at
1 IA, col. 2 (operators of the Country Walk Babysitting Service in Miami, Fla., were charged
with 10 counts of sexual battery on children under 11 and face possible sentences of 25 years to
life in prison; the day-care center had been unlicensed and one of the operators had been on
probation from a 1982 child molestation conviction and the Florida State Corrections Depart-
ment did not inform the Health and Rehabilitative Services agency about the operator's previ-
ous conviction). A Bethesda, Md. man was arrested and charged with sexual offenses against
six boys, ages 6 to 11, in his neighborhood. Man Charged in Sex Cases Had 2 Prior Convic-
tions, Wash. Post, Feb. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 1. He was employed by a private Bethesda school
as a gymnastics instructor. Id. The instructor had been convicted of child molesting in 1972
and again in 1980. The 1980 conviction resulted from the molestation of a boy he coached in a
community soccer league. School authorities stated that they did not know of either convic-
tion. Id. In Maryland, schools and other facilities that care for children are not required to
run criminal background checks, "nor is the information readily available." Id. In response to
this arrest and other recent sexual abuse cases, the Maryland General Assembly is presently
[Vol. 34:10211022
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More children are sexually abused in their own homes than anywhere else.6
The child victim may be abused by a relative, a family friend, or an authority
figure.7 Strangers constitute only a "small percentage" of abusers.' The
child victim of sexual abuse is most often female,9 and the victims, both male
and female, range in age from one or two months up to eighteen years.10
One commentator estimates that one-half of the child victims of sexual abuse
are under the age of eleven."
considering a bill that "would require criminal checks of persons seeking employment in pub-
lic or private schools and day care centers." Id. If a person is found to have been convicted of
murder, child abuse, child pornography, kidnapping, or other crimes, that person would be
denied the job. Id. At a military-operated day-care center for 130 children of military and
civilian personnel at the United States Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., child sexual
abuse charges were investigated. Scandal Jolts West Point, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1984, at A1,
col. 1. A civil suit was then filed in federal court that sought screening of all children at the
center to check for abuse. The suit also sought an admission of responsibility and compensa-
tion from West Point for the alleged sexual abuse, and transfer of the staff members alleged to
have committed the sexual abuse. The suit was filed by two Army couples who alleged that
their daughters were victims. One of the daughters, a two-year-old, has already been inter-
viewed and her testimony preserved on videotape by a hidden camera for future court use. Id.
6. What Price Day Care? NEWSWEEK, supra note 5, at 19.
7. Meyers, Little Witnesses, 11 STUDENT LAW. 14, 16 (Sept. 1982); A Hidden Epidemic,
NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 31 (75% of child molesters are friends, neighbors, or relatives);
Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 2 J. OF CHILD ABUSE & NE-
GLECT 177, 182 (1983). A child is "three times more likely to be molested by a recognized,
trusted adult than by a stranger." Id. at 182. One survey showed "10% of all females have
been sexually victimized as children by an adult relative, including almost 2% involving the
man in the role of father." Id. A later survey shows a "16% prevalence of molestation by
relatives." Id.; see A. RUSSELL & C. TRAINOR, supra note 3 (based on an analysis of officially
reported data between 1976-1982, approximately 77% of the perpetrators of child sexual abuse
are parents (57% natural parents and 16% "other relatives")).
8. Studies estimate that only 10% to 40% of molestation cases involve strangers. The
Child Molester: No 'Profile,' L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1984, at § 1, col. 1. Yet "[w]e continue to
behave as if most cases involve perpetrators who are strangers to the child and who fit the
mythical 'dirty old man in the alley' stereotype that seems to be indigenous to our culture."
Burgess, supra note 1, at xv. Perpetrators cannot be stereotyped. "[S]exual abuse does not
seem to depend on such factors as race, geography, poverty, or uneducated, alcoholic or dis-
turbed parents." The Culprit Behind Sexual Child Abuse, Chi. Trib., Sept. 23, 1984, at § 1,
col. 3 (Midwest ed.). The most respectable of citizens commit child abuse.
Among those who pleaded no contest or were convicted of charges involving child
molestation in Southern California in the last three years were a youth pastor, a boys'
club director, an airport executive, a Catholic priest, a telephone company security
agent, a Boy Scout leader, an elementary schoolteacher who was described as an
active leader in many youth activities, a nursery school operator, a civil engineer, a
fireman, and a youth baseball coach.
The Child Molester: No 'Profile,' L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1984, at § 1, col. 1.
9. A. RUSSELL & C. TRAINOR, supra note 3 (85% of sexual abuse victims are female).
10. S. Con. Res. 120, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 6833 (1984) (statement of
Sen. Hawkins).
11. Id.
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Because the sexual assaults most often take place in the privacy of the
home, as confirmed by statistics on the relationship of the perpetrator to the
victim, 12 there are few, if any, witnesses. The trust relationship between the
child and her abuser enables the abuser to cloak the assault in a secretive and
conspiratorial atmosphere."3 In many cases, the abuse consists of a continu-
ing series of sexual activities between the abuser and his victim.' 4 This is
especially so in incestuous relationships. Dr. Roland Summit, a leading au-
thority on child molestation, has described a child sexual abuse accommoda-
tion syndrome. What the child perceives and acts upon in a sexual abuse
situation, according to Dr. Summit, usually contradicts many common adult
assumptions.' 5 He asserts that in many, though not all, child sexual abuse
cases there is a delay between the assault and a statement by the child dis-
closing the assault. 6
Fear of reprisal by the abuser and fear that disclosure of the assault may
be met with punishment, rejection, or disbelief are reasons a child will delay
reporting abuse, if she reports it at all.' 7 In addition, if the child sees the
assailant as an authority figure, she may interpret the sexual activity as an
extension of this authority.' 8 In the significant number of intra-familial as
well as extra-familial cases involving a child's authority figure,19 force is not
necessarily used. Thus, physical evidence of the assault is minimal or per-
haps nonexistent.2 °
12. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
13. Of all the. . . explanations provided by the adult [abuser], the only consistent
and meaningful impression gained by the child is one of danger and fearful outcome
based on secrecy. . . . [T]he secrecy makes it clear to the child that this is some-
thing bad and dangerous. The secrecy is both the source of fear and the promise of
safety: 'Everything will be all right if you just don't tell.' . . . A child with no
knowledge or awareness of sex and even with no pain or embarrassment from the
sexual experience itself will still be stigmatized with a sense of badness and danger
from the pervasive secrecy.
Summit, supra note 7, at 181.
14. See Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without Testimony in Court by the Vic-
tim, 15 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 131, 133 & n.9 (1981).
15. Summit, supra note 7, at 181-91. Dr. Summit believes that a child who reports a
sexual assault "may feel so anxious and guilty and fearful that he'll immediately take it back."
Child-Molestation Testimony Reveals Inherent Problems, Wash. Post, Jan. 28, 1985, at A3, col.
2. "Retraction is just about as universal as denial." Id.
16. Summit, supra note 7, at 186-88; see, e.g., People v. Davison, 12 Mich. App. 429, 163
N.W.2d 10 (1968) (nine-year-old girl delayed making statement for two weeks after assault
because of her fear of defendant).
17. DeJong, Hervada, & Emmett, Epidemiologic Variations in Childhood Sexual Abuse, 7
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 155, 161 (1983).
18. Id.
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. See Lloyd, The Corroboration of Sexual Victimization of Children, in A.B.A., NAT'L
[Vol. 34:10211024
Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Although corroboration of the sex offense in all cases involving minors is
mandated by statute in only one state,2 1 prosecutors often feel corroboration
is necessary to obtain a conviction or to avoid a judgment of acquittal for
insufficient evidence. 2 Corroboration is often lacking. In addition to the
delay in the reporting of the abuse, the absence of eyewitnesses, and the
dearth of physical evidence, the prosecutor also must deal with the fact that
the child victim, possessing limited cognitive and verbal skills, may lack
credibility.23 Despite a child's inability to articulate her story as well as an
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
& THE LAW 103, 112 (1983).
21. Id.. Nebraska requires corroboration in all sex offense cases involving minors. See
State v. Aby, 205 Neb. 267, 287 N.W.2d 68 (1980) (testimony of prosecutrix alone, uncorrobo-
rated by any other evidence, not sufficient to sustain a conviction for sexual assault). The
District of Columbia recently repealed its corroboration requirement for a child's testimony in
a sex offense case. Prior to the statutory change, in " 17 percent of all child sexual abuse cases
during one 2-year period [in the District of Columbia] which were referred to prosecutors by
the police department, charges were not filed because of a lack of corroborative evidence."
A.B.A., NAT'L LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE, LEGAL ISSUES AND APPROACHES 16 (1981); see New War on Child Abuse,
Nat'l L.J., June 25, 1984, at 1, col. 1. Defense lawyers in the District of Columbia opposed
changing the corroboration rule but a District Attorney in New York believes a new New
York law that eliminates the corroboration requirement in child sexual abuse cases will have a
"substantial impact on our ability to prosecute child-molestation cases." New War on Child
Abuse, supra at 27 (quoting District Attorney Holtzman). Many states still require corrobora-
tion of a child victim's testimony in limited circumstances, such as when unclear or inconsis-
tent testimony is given by the complainant. See, e.g., State v. Munoz, 114 Ariz. 466, 561 P.2d
1238 (1976) (corroboration required if complainant's testimony recites facts that are physically
impossible); LeBlanc v. People, 161 Colo. 274, 276, 421 P.2d 474, 476 (1967) (corroboration
necessary if conflicting testimony given).
22. See The Culprit Behind Sexual Child Abuse, Chi. Trib., Sept. 23, 1984, § 1, at 14, col.
1. Twenty-four adults in Jordan, Minnesota were charged with participating in an "organized
sexual child abuse ring" of 37 children. The Scott County prosecutor based her case on the
children's testimony and the first two adults on trial were acquitted of child molestation. One
juror commented, "The kids alone weren't enough ... the supporting evidence wasn't there
... "Id.; see Child Sex-abuse Trial Begins, Chi. Trib., Aug. 28, 1984, § 1, at 6 (only adult to
corroborate the children's statements in the Jordan, Minn. case was a man twice convicted of
child molesting); "Sex Ring" Fallout, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 17 (only adult who corroborated
the children's stories confessed in November 1984 that "he made up the tale"); Charges
Dropped, Wash. Post, Oct. 16, 1984, at A9, col. 6 (prosecutors dropped charges against re-
maining adults charged in the Jordan, Minn. child sexual abuse case because "dismissing the
charges would be in the best interest of the children and of justice"); "Sex Ring" Fallout,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1985, at 17 (six of the Jordan, Minn. families have filed multimillion-dollar
civil suits against the prosecutor, county officials, and therapists involved in the initial criminal
proceedings); see also Jurors' Reactions to Child Witnesses, 40 J. OF Soc. ISSUES 139, 141
(1984).
23. A.B.A., NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTEC-
TION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES (1982); Out of the Mouths of Babes, TIME, Jan. 31, 1983, at 58. To
assist young children with limited vocabularies and biological knowledge, courts frequently
allow the children on the witness stand to demonstrate the sexual activity through the use of
1985] 1025
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adult victim, however, there is little evidence indicating that a child's ac-
count of an event is less reliable.24 If the child renders several accounts of
the incident, the one closest in time to the sexual activity is usually the most
reliable. This is true because a child's memory fades faster than an adult's.25
As the time between the incident and the trial may be many months,26 the
prosecutor may wish to present into evidence the child victim's original-
and thus most accurate-account.
If the prosecutor decides not to have the child victim appear in court and
testify,27 he may seek to introduce the child's account of the sexual abuse in
two ways. First, he may seek to introduce, under the excited utterance ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, the out-of-court statement made by the child
when first revealing the event to an adult.28 Courts have applied different
standards in judging the applicability of hearsay exceptions to the statements
of sexually abused children. Second, the prosecutor may use videotape to
preserve the child's deposition and introduce the videotape at trial in lieu of
the child's in-court testimony.29 In recognition of the difficulties inherent in
anatomically correct dolls. Puppets Help Children Shed Horrors of Abuse, L.A. Times, Apr. 2,
1984, § I, at 1, col. 3, & at 3, col. 1 (use of anatomically correct dolls by the Children's Insti-
tute International, assisting in the Los Angeles McMartin preschool case, supra note 5, to help
the children describe the abuse).
24. Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 1, at 127.
25. Loftus & Davies, Distortions in the Memory of Children, 40 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 51
(1984).
26. Bernstein, Out of the Mouths of Babes: When Children Take the Witness Stand, 4
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 11, 14 (1982).
[T]rials are notoriously prone to delay. . . . A certain trial date is not a date certain
for trial. Rather, it is a target date. Those working with children must be ready for
the additional stresses created by and for the child who is available to testify, men-
tally prepared, but who is then faced with a significant delay.
Id.
27. Recommended by the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence in its Final
Report of September 1984, at 31-32. For an alternative to testimony by the child in the court-
room, see Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 976, 1014-17 (1969) (examining proposed "child-courtroom" in
which the accused and the spectators are seated behind a one-way glass for as long as the child
testifies).
28. See infra notes 32, 35-36 and accompanying text.
29. At the preliminary hearings in two California child molestation cases, judicial ap-
proval was given to the introduction of the victims' testimony through closed-circuit television.
In People v. Greenup, the child victims testified, via television, from a nearby jury room. Girls
Will Testify by TV in Sex Abuse Case, L.A. Times, May 15, 1984, § II, at 1, col. 5. Los
Angeles Municipal Court Judge Candace D. Cooper approved the plan, which allowed a par-
ent or "other supporting representative," a bailiff, and a television technician to be in the jury
room with the children as they testified. Id. The defendant, an operator of a private elemen-
tary school in 1980 and 1981, agreed to the television testimony and his counsel supported it
because it "eliminated the highly charged emotional state that a small child will display to a
jury." New War on Child Abuse, supra note 21, at 28. The cost of the closed-circuit camera
[Vol. 34:10211026
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the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases, some state legislatures specifi-
cally have authorized the prosecutor's use of one or both of these options.
Several states have enacted special child sexual abuse hearsay exceptions to
ensure that an abused child's statements, if qualified, will be admitted.3° Ten
states recently have enacted statutes allowing videotape depositions to be
admitted into evidence.
3 1
This Comment will examine statutory alternatives to in-court testimony
by a child victim of sexual abuse. These alternatives can be used to reduce
psychological trauma to the victim and to produce more reliable testimony.
In examining the statutory child victim hearsay exceptions, this Comment
will outline the courts' interpretations of the present excited utterance hear-
say exception and discuss its inadequacy in covering the statements of child
sexual abuse victims in many cases.
This Comment will also examine the newly enacted videotape child depo-
sition statutes in light of the defendant's sixth amendment right to cross-
examine witnesses. This Comment will conclude that innovation in the ad-
versary system is necessary to accommodate the child victim as witness but
should not be used to reduce the rights of the defendant.
I. TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
VICTIMS' OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS: THE EXCITED
UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE
A. Hearsay and the Excited Utterance Exception
Hearsay is defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence as a "statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, of-
fered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."32 The Federal
Rules generally prohibit introduction into evidence of out-of-court assertions
to prove the facts stated in them.33 A child's spontaneous declaration or
used for the children's testimony in the Greenup case was "roughly $1000 per day." Id.
Under California law, the final decision to admit the videotape of the children's television
testimony at trial is left to the discretion of the trial judge, to be made at the time of trial. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1985). Substantially similar procedures were used for the
child victim witnesses in the McMartin preschool case in California. People v. Buckey, No.
A750900 (filed Mar. 22, 1984); see Children in McMartin Sex Case to Testify on Closed-Circuit
TV, L.A. Times, July 6, 1984, § II, at 1, col. 4.
30. These states are Colorado (1983), Illinois (1984), Indiana (1984), Kansas (1982), Min-
nesota (1984), Utah (1983), and Washington (1982). See infra note 101.
31. These states are Arizona (1978), Arkansas (1981), California (1982), Colorado (1983),
Florida (1981), Maine (1983), Montana (1983), New Mexico (1981), South Dakota (1983), and
Wisconsin (1984).
32. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
33. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 249, at 732 (3d ed. 1984).
1985] 1027
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narrative account of a sexual incident would be barred from introduction at
trial under this rule as inadmissible hearsay. The Federal Rules, however,
include several exceptions to the hearsay rule,3 4 including one that permits
the admission into evidence of "excited utterances.",35 Under this exception,
statements by child victims regarding sexual abuse could be admitted as
evidence.
Two federal courts of appeals have upheld the admissibility of a child sex-
ual abuse victim's hearsay statements under the excited utterance excep-
tion. 6 In United States v. Nick,37 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed a conviction for sexual assault on a child based on
testimony admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule. The testimony at issue was that of the victim's mother, who, in court,
discussed her child's statements, including his identification of the defendant
as his assailant. 3' The assault in question occurred when the defendant,
Nick, was baby-sitting a three-year-old boy in his home on an Indian reser-
vation.39 When the mother arrived to pick up her child, she found him
asleep with the defendant and discovered the child's pants were unzipped. 4
The child made no statements at this time, but when they arrived home, the
mother found a white substance on the child's clothing.4 1 The mother then
began to question him.4 2 In response, the child described an act of anal
intercourse with the defendant.43 The sexual act was confirmed a day later
by a physician."
34. See FED. R. EvID. 803, 804.
35. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) defines an "excited utterance" as "[a] statement re-
lating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event or condition." The advisory committee note states: "The theory of
Exception [paragraph] (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement
which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious
fabrication." 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1747, at 195 (Chadbourn rev. 1976). Spontaneity
is the key factor. Under rule 803(2), the "standard of measurement is the duration of the state
of excitement." FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee note.
36. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001
(1981); United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979).
37. 604 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1979).
38. Id. at 1202.
39. Id. at 1200-01.




44. Id. The physician testified to the child's statements of the assault that were relevant
regarding the cause of the injury, omitting the identity of the assailant. Id. at 1201-02. This
testimony was admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) as statements "made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment .... " Nick, 604 F.2d at 1202. Expert testimony
identified the white substance on the child's clothing as semen. Id. at 1201.
1028 [Vol. 34:1021
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The defendant charged that admission of the testimony under the excited
utterance exception was inappropriate because the child was not "suffering
distress" when he related the incident to his mother. The court, relying on
the record and the district court's conclusion, agreed that the statement was
made while the child was "still suffering pain and distress from the
assault."45
In an analogous case, United States v. Iron Shell,46 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction of defendant
Iron Shell for assault with intent to commit rape on a female child on the
Rosebud Indian Reservation in South Dakota.47 Nine-year-old Lucy was
assaulted by the defendant, who threw her into bushes and partially removed
her pants.48 The assault occurred somewhere between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m.
4 9
A Bureau of Indian Affairs Law Enforcement Officer was notified by a wit-
ness who saw Lucy immediately after the assault.5" The officer interviewed
Lucy between approximately 7:15 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.51 In response to a
question by the officer regarding what had happened, Lucy described the
assault in a "halting manner."52 She was not hysterical or crying, but to the
investigating officer, she "appeared nervous and scared."
5 3
Lucy testified at trial but could only partially confirm the events sur-
rounding the assault.54 The interviewing officer was allowed, under the ex-
cited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, to testify to the statements
Lucy made to her.55 The defendant objected to the admission of the officer's
hearsay testimony as the interview took place between forty-five minutes and
one hour and fifteen minutes after the assault, when Lucy, arguably, was no
longer " 'under the stress of excitement caused by the event.' ,56 The de-
fendant also asserted that Lucy's statements were not spontaneous because
they were made in response to questioning and thus were the product of
"reasoned reflection fostered by conversations between herself and her com-
panions following the assault."57
45. Id. at 1204.
46. 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981).
47. Id. at 80.




52. Id. at 81 n.5.
53. Id. at 81.
54. Id. at 82. For a representative sample of the prosecutor's direct examination of Lucy,
see id. at 82 n.7.
55. Id. at 85.
56. Id. (quoting from FED. R. EvID. 803(2)).
57. Id. The court stated that it was not controlling that Lucy's statement was made in
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The court stated that resolution of this issue was a "close question."
58
The court listed several factors to be considered by a trial court in determin-
ing whether such statements should be admitted under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule. Relevant factors, the court stated, include
"the age of the declarant, the physical and mental condition of the declarant,
the characteristics of the event and the subject matter of the statements."
59
The court's recognition of these factors, instead of reliance solely on the
lapse of time between the event and the statement, was instrumental in the
affirmance of the admission of Lucy's statements.
The text of rule 803(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence merely requires
the declarant to be "under the stress of excitement caused by the event."'
In terms of minutes and seconds, the time period contemplated by the rule is
difficult to determine. By applying the factors listed by the Iron Shell court
to the varying circumstances of the cases before them, courts have recog-
nized the presence of stress over a broad range of time periods following the
stressful event. When the declarant is a child in a sexual abuse case, the
courts are especially apt to consider factors other than time in determining
whether the child's statements fit within the excited utterance exception. 6I
B. State Application of the Excited Utterance Exception
Not surprisingly, given the importance of the hearsay doctrine and the
heat generated in discussions of its many exceptions, state adoptions of rule
803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence depart from the federal model in sev-
eral ways.62 Twenty-five states have adopted the excited utterance excep-
tion, rule 803(2), of the Federal Rules verbatim.63 Several other states
employ common law rules of evidence providing for some type of excited
response to a question. Id. "The single question 'what happened' has been held not to destroy
the excitement necessary to qualify under this exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 86. The
court cited two cases in which excited utterances were made in response to inquiries: United
States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The decisive factor is that the circum-
stances reasonably justify the conclusion that the remarks were not made under the impetus of
reflection. Whether this conclusion is justified depends upon the facts of each case ....");
McCurdy v. Greyhound Corp., 346 F.2d 224, 226 (3d Cir. 1965) (because car accident victim
was noticeably in an excited state when police arrived and questioned him, "there is little
danger that he had either the time to reflect or sufficient use of his reason to fabricate and
manufacture an account of the accident").
58. 633 F.2d at 86.
59. Id.
60. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
61. See supra notes 16-18, 20; infra note 93 and accompanying text.
62. D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 437, at 466 (1980 & Supp.
1984).
63. Id. at 467-82.
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utterance exception in many cases. A review of state cases indicates, how-
ever, that the adoption of the federal rules or the application of similar com-
mon law rules does not necessarily assure that state court judges will follow
federal case law interpreting the rules.
In State v. Ritchey,64 a child sexual assault case, the Arizona Supreme
Court upheld the admission into evidence of a six-year-old girl's statements
under the excited utterance exception.65 In Ritchey, the defendant, a friend
of the family, took the two girls in the family, ages four and six, "to a place
near the airport where they could watch the airplanes. ' ' 66 It was there, the
children alleged, that the defendant molested them.67 Upon returning the
girls to their home, the defendant left the house after some ten minutes,
returned with beer approximately fifteen minutes later, and left the house
again a few minutes later.6' The mother noted several changes in the chil-
dren's demeanor after they returned, and in the manner in which they acted
toward the defendant. 69 After the defendant left, the mother asked the girls
where they had been. Their responses to that question were the focus of the
defendant's objections.7"
The court used the traditional excited utterance test 71 to allow hearsay
statements into court over the defendant's objections. The court specifically
stated that the age of the children involved and the identity of the perpetra-
tor of the crime should be taken into account.72 The court further noted
that children of four and six years of age know "little if anything about sex-
ual matters.",73 The court found the perpetrator's position as a "good family
friend" to be a consideration that could affect a child's reaction to a sexual
64. 107 Ariz. 552, 490 P.2d 558 (1971).
65. Id. at 556, 490 P.2d at 562.
66. Id. at 553, 490 P.2d at 559.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 555, 490 P.2d at 561.
69. Id. The girls were unusually quiet instead of rowdy. The mother thought the elder
child may have been crying because of streaks on her face. Further, the girls did not sit near
the defendant although they usually did when he visited (at least two to three times a week).
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court identified the three requisites that compose this test:
1. There must be a startling event.
2. The words spoken must be spoken soon after the event so as not to give the
person speaking the words time to fabricate.
3. The words spoken must relate to the startling event.
Id. (citing 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 35, at § 1750).
72. Id. at 556, 490 P.2d at 562.
73. Id. The mother was also asked if she had ever "discussed sex" with the children and
the mother replied that she had not done so. Id.
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74assault.
In this specific factual situation, the court acknowledged that it would
apply a less strict test in determining whether a startling event had oc-
curred.75 Thus, that the children were not hysterical or outwardly upset
about the assault, in the court's opinion, was not decisive in determining
whether the children were still under the stress of the event. The fact that
their demeanor had changed was sufficient to prove that stress was present.
The statements by the children were in response to a question asked forty-
five minutes after the assault and thus did not fit within the excited utterance
exception as traditionally applied. Nevertheless, the court admitted the
statements. In doing so, the court highlighted a key difference between chil-
dren and adults. Adults often react more quickly and emotionally to a sex-
ual assault. Children may not view the assault as the startling event that
adults perceive it to be.7 6
Courts have considered other mitigating factors in cases involving state-
ments not readily fitting into the excited utterance exception. In People v.
Bonneau,77 the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a defend-
ant for taking indecent liberties with a seven-year-old girl. On her way to
visit her grandmother, the victim was offered a ride by the defendant, who
had never before met the girl. It was in his car that the alleged assault oc-
curred.78 When the girl arrived at her grandparents' home, she was nervous,
excited, and frightened. Her face was swollen and her hair messed.79 De-
spite repeated questioning from both her mother and grandparents, she dis-
closed nothing about the offense for three days. On the third day, after more
questions from her mother, she told of the defendant's assault.
Although the girl testified fully about the assault at trial, the child's
mother was allowed to testify to the details of the girl's story as it was re-
lated to her three days after the assault.8 ° The appeals court affirmed the
lower court's ruling admitting the girl's statements to her mother under the
74. Id.
75. Id. But cf State v. Rivera, 139 Ariz. 409, 678 P.2d 1373 (1984). In Rivera, the Ari-
zona Supreme Court upheld the less strict Ritchey test but further refined it. 139 Ariz. at 412,
678 P.2d at 1376. The court did not allow into evidence under an excited utterance exception
a statement by a three-year-old girl five to ten hours after the alleged molestation where the
girl showed no change in her behavior or demeanor. Id. at 413, 678 P.2d at 1377. In dicta, the
court acknowledged that, given the nature of child sexual abuse, "the excited utterance rule is
therefore broadened .... " Id. at 412, 678 P.2d at 1376.
76. 107 Ariz. at 556, 490 P.2d at 562.
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res gestae exception.8' The court discounted the delay factor in upholding
the statements' admissibility. The girl's feeling of fear, the court reasoned,
explained the delay between the assault and the account of the assault.82
The girl testified that the defendant had threatened her by telling her that if
she told anybody "he would get after her again.",8 3 According to the court,
the child's age, combined with her fear of reprisal, readily explained her
delay in making the statement. Therefore, the court concluded, the state-
ment should be treated as if made "upon the first opportunity shortly after
the occurrence of the offense."
84
Similarly, the Florida Supreme Court, in Purdy v. State,8 5 affirmed the
conviction of a defendant and upheld the admission of a seven-year-old girl's
statement following a sexual assault. The child's statement was admissible
under the excited utterance exception, the court found, to refute any doubts
concerning the assailant's identity.8 6 Witnesses at the trial were allowed to
testify that the child, while at the house in which the defendant and the child
were found together, stated that the defendant was the perpetrator of the
sexual assault. The child did not testify at trial. The court stressed that the
child's out-of-court declaration was not the only evidence that was used to
convict the defendant. There was sufficient physical evidence from which a
jury could conclude that the defendant had committed the sexual assault.8 7
The court also noted that the child showed no signs of extreme emotional or
psychological distress at the time of making the statement or immediately
81. Id. at 162; accord People v. Davison, 12 Mich. App. 429, 163 N.W.2d 10 (1968) (nine-
year-old girl's statement to her older sister within two weeks after sexual assault was admissi-
ble as part of excited utterance exception). Res gestae is a "spontaneous declaration made by a
person immediately after an event and before the mind has an opportunity to conjure a false-
hood. It represents an exception to the hearsay rule and should be referred to as a spontaneous
exclamation rather than res gestae." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (5th ed. 1979).
82. See Summit, supra note 7, at 181.
83. 323 Mich. at 237, 35 N.W.2d at 162.
84. Id. at 231, 35 N.W.2d at 162. There was a "tender years" presumption in Michigan.
The court recognized that:
the rule in (Michigan] is that, where the victim is of tender years, the testimony of
the details of her complaint may be introduced in corroboration of her evidence, if
her statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of manufac-
ture; and delay in making the complaint is excusable so far as it is caused by fear or
other equally effective circumstance.
Id.
85. 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977).
86. Id. at 5; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(2) (West 1979).
87. 343 So. 2d at 5. The court cited the defendant's nakedness in his room where the
witnesses discovered the girl, his proximity to the child, and the actual physical condition of
the child. Expert medical testimony indicated that penetration of both the vagina and anus
had occurred. Id.
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afterwards."8
In contrast, the Indiana Supreme Court, in Ketcham v. State," overruled
the trial court's admission into evidence of a five-year-old girl's statements to
her mother under a res gestae exception. Though her mother testified in
detail about the story her daughter had told her when the mother questioned
her about bruises in the pelvic region, the child victim did not testify.9° The
child's out-of-court declarations were made approximately two hours after
the alleged rape. Because of this delay, the court concluded, spontaneity was
lacking for purposes of the excited utterance exception.9 The court came to
this conclusion even though the mother testified that when she asked her
daughter about her delay in recounting the alleged rape, the child answered
that she was afraid because the defendant had threatened to kill both mother
and daughter if she told. The court stated that "[i]f a small child could tell
the story to her mother, she could have told it on the witness stand to the
jury, where it could be subjected to the usual tests of credibility.",
92
Courts frequently have looked to the childlike phrasing of the child's de-
scription of the sexual assault to determine the reliability of the accusation.
93
In State v. Bloomstrom,9 4 the Court of Appeals of Washington admitted into
evidence, under the excited utterance exception, an eight-year-old girl's
statement made moments after the defendant returned the girl to her
mother.95 The element of spontaneity, the court held, was not destroyed by
the questions put forth to the child by the mother. The nature of the child's
response was one element the court looked to in determining whether the
88. Id.; see People v. Orduno, 80 Cal. App. 3d 738, 145 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1978) (statements
of three-year-old girl to her mother immediately upon leaving defendant's apartment and while
still in a state of excitement were admissible into evidence under the excited utterance excep-
tion in a prosecution for child molestation even if the child would be too young to testify in
court).
89. 240 Ind. 107, 162 N.E.2d 247 (1959).
90. Id. at 107, 162 N.E.2d at 248.
91. Id. at 107, 162 N.E.2d at 249. The court recognized the existence of cases that
"stretch the time within which the details of a complaint may be admissible" as an excited
utterance but was not persuaded by such reasoning, including the reasoning used in People v.
Bonneau, 323 Mich. 237, 35 N.W.2d 161 (1948).
92. 240 Ind. at 107, 162 N.E.2d at 250.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979) (child's statement
to mother: "Yeah, Eneas [Nick] stuck his tutu in my butt"); People in Interest of O.E.P., 654
P.2d 312, 318 (Colo. 1982) ("A child ... is hardly adept at the type of reasoned reflection
necessary to concoct a false story relating to a bizarre sexual experience implicating the child's
mother."); State v. Padilla, 110 Wis. 2d 414, 427, 329 N.W.2d 263, 270 (1980) ("IT]he young
victim's account of the present sexual assault must be true because the victim could have no
other source for the considerable knowledge of the details of sexual intercourse that her ac-
count displayed.").
94. 12 Wash. App. 416, 529 P.2d 1124 (1974).
95. Id. at 416, 529 P.2d at 1125.
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excited response exception was applicable. 96
The court noted that a young child should not be expected to relate a tale
of sexual assault in the "generic terms" used by adults.97 Use of adult
phrases-for example, "he raped me"-would lend credence to a charge that
the child's statement was a fabrication, the court stated.98 The childlike use
of children's terms and expressions to describe the assault lend credibility to
the utterance.
This same reasoning was used by the Iowa Supreme Court, in State v.
Brown,99 to explain the reliability of a child's out-of-court statements of sex-
ual abuse. Although the introduction of the five-year-old boy's statements to
his mother and her friend under the excited utterance exception at trial was
not an issue on appeal, the court explained the rationale behind such an
admission. Because a child rarely has extensive knowledge of sexual mat-
ters, the court stated, the "foreign acts, in effect, speak through the child
victim because his or her knowledge of them suggests a previous firsthand
experience with sex."'"
The courts' diversified views regarding the nature of child sexual abuse
and the varying facts of the cases before them have resulted in an inconsis-
tent application of the excited utterance exception. Relaxation or distortion
of the excited utterance exception to admit children's out-of-court state-
ments into evidence in sexual abuse cases aids in the prosecution of abusers.
Such relaxation, however, often may serve to undermine the reliability of an
803(2)-type exception. To retain the trustworthiness of the excited utterance
exception while accommodating the special circumstances surrounding a
child sexual abuse case, innovation in the law of evidence is necessary.
II. STATUTORY APPROACHES TO CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE VICTIMS'
OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
A. Existing Statutory Child Sexual Abuse Hearsay
Exceptions-An Overview
Seven states-Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Utah, and
Washington-have enacted statutes that specifically permit out-of-court
statements of child sexual abuse victims to be admitted into evidence if there
96. Id. at 416, 529 P.2d at 1126. "When the mother asked what had happened, the child
replied to the effect that the defendant had a big finger in his pants; that he took her pants
down and pushed the big finger into her real hard." Id. at 416, 529 P.2d at 1125.
97. Id. at 416, 529 P.2d at 1126.
98. Id.
99. 341 N.W.2d 10 (Iowa 1983).
100. Id. at 14.
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are sufficient indicia of reliability. 101 All but one of the statutes, the Illinois
101. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1984):
Statements of a child victim of unlawful sexual offense against a child-hearsay
exception. (1) An out-of-court statement made by a child,. . . describing any act of
sexual contact, intrusion, or penetration, . . . performed with, by, or on the child
declarant, not otherwise admissible by a statute or court rule which provides an ex-
ception to the objection of hearsay, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings
in which the child is a victim of an unlawful sexual offense, . . . if:
(a) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of
reliability; and
(b) The child either:
(I) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(II) Is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act
which is the subject of the statement.
(2) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this section, the court shall instruct the
jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given the statement
and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the
child, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was
made, and any other relevant factor.
(3) The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of
his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.
Id.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-10 (Smith-Hurd 1984):
In a prosecution for a sexual act perpetrated upon a child under the age of 13, .
the following evidence shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
(1) testimony by such child that he or she complained of such act to another; and
(2) testimony by the person to whom the child complained that such complaint
was made in order to corroborate the child's testimony.
Id.
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Bums 1984):
(a) This section applies to criminal actions for the following:
(1) Child molesting. ...
(b) A statement that:
(1) Is made by a child who was under ten [10] years of age at the time of the
statement;
(2) Concerns an act that is a material element of an offense listed in subsection (a)
that was allegedly committed against the child; and
(3) Is not otherwise admissible in evidence under statute or court rule; is admissi-
ble in evidence in a criminal action for an offense listed in subsection (a) if the re-
quirements of subsection (c) are met.
(c) A statement described in subsection (b) is admissible in evidence in a criminal
action listed in subsection (a) if, after notice to the defendant of a hearing and of his
right to be present:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing:
(A) Conducted outside the presence of the jury; and
(B) Attended by the child;
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indica-
tions of reliability; and
(2) The child:
(A) Testifies at the trial; or
(B) Is found by the court to be unavailable as a witness because:
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statute, require either the child victim's testimony at trial or proof that the
(i) A psychiatrist has certified that the child's participation in the trial would
be a traumatic experience for the child;
(ii) A physician has certified that the child cannot participate in the trial for
medical reasons; or
(iii) The court has determined that the child is incapable of understanding the
nature and obligation of an oath.
(d) If a child is unavailable to testify at the trial for a reason listed in subsection
(c)(2)(B), a statement may be admitted in evidence under this section only if there is
corroborative evidence of the act that was allegedly committed against the child.
(e) A statement may not be admitted in evidence under this section unless the prose-
cuting attorney informs the defendant and the defendant's attorney of:
(1) His intention to introduce the statement in evidence; and
(2) The content of the statement; within a time that will give the defendant a
fair opportunity to prepare a response to the statement before the trial.
Id.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460 (1983):
Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the
hearing offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inad-
missible except: . . . (dd) In a criminal proceeding or in a proceeding to determine if
a child is a deprived child under the Kansas juvenile code or a child in need of care
under the Kansas code for care of children, a statement made by a child, to prove the
crime or that the child is a deprived child or a child in need of care, if:
(1) The child is alleged to be a victim of the crime, a deprived child or a child in
need of care; and
(2) The trial judge finds, after a hearing on the matter, that the child is disqualified
or unavailable as a witness, the statement is apparently reliable and the child was not
induced to make the statement falsely by use of threats or promises.
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this subsection in a trial to a jury, the trial
judge shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit
to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the
age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under
which the statement was made, any possible threats or promises that might have been
made to the child to obtain the statement and any other relevant factor.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1984):
Subd. 3 Certain out-of-court statements admissible. An out-of-court statement
made by a child under the age of ten years alleging, explaining, denying, or describ-
ing any act of sexual contact or penetration performed with or on the child by an-
other, not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in
evidence if:
(a) the court, or person authorized to receive evidence finds, in a hearing con-
ducted outside of the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances
of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the statement is made
provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(b) the child either:
(i) testifies at the proceedings; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act; and
(c) the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of his intention to
offer the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the
proceeding at which he intends to offer the statement into evidence to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
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child victim is unavailable as a witness."12 If the child victim does not tes-
tify, five of the states require corroboration of the act that is the subject of
the child's out-of-court statement. 103 In addition, these same five states re-
Id.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (Supp. 1983):
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of evidence, a child victim's
out of court [sic] statement regarding sexual abuse of the child is admissible into
evidence . so long as:
(1) the child testifies; or
(2) in the event the child does not testify, there is other corroborative evidence of
the abuse. Before admitting such a statement into evidence, the judge shall deter-
mine whether the general purposes of the evidence are such that the interest of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. In addition, the
court shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature and duration of the
abuse, the relationship of the child to the offender, the reliability of the assertion, and
the reliability of the child witness, in deciding whether to admit such a statement.
(2) A statement may be admitted under this exception only if the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with an opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention in
offering the statement, and the particulars of it.
(3) For purposes of this section, a child is a person under the age of ten.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (1985):
A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of
sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible
by statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings in the
courts of the state of Washington if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that
the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, That when the child is unavailable as a
witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of
the act.
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the
statement makes known to the adverse party his intention to offer the statement and
the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
Id.
102. The Illinois statute does not contemplate the unavailability of the child as a witness.
It assumes the child victim will testify to a previous complaint or a witness will testify to the
child's complaint in order to corroborate the child's testimony. Illinois Senate Bill 741, which
failed in the House Subcommittee, "would have created an exception to the hearsay rule in
prosecutions for sexual acts perpetrated on a child under the age of 13, by allowing an adult to
testify as to the details of the child's timely out-of-court statement about such an act." ILLI-
NOIS LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION, THE CHILD VICTIM, A REPORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 26 (1983).
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(d) (Burns
1984); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411(1) (Supp.
1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120(2)(b) (Supp. 1985).
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quire that advance notice be given to the adverse party in each case indicat-
ing the statement will be offered under the exception.
To determine the statement's reliability, the Washington statute requires
the court to first conduct a hearing outside of the presence of the jury.1 "4
The statute allows the court to look to indicia of reliability (for example,
content, time, and circumstances) other than spontaneity. 105
The excited utterance exception is a "class" exception intended to insure
that the court will have guidelines in judging children's statements and,
therefore, will not admit or exclude these statements arbitrarily.1 °6 The
statements will not be judged by criteria, such as a strict time reporting re-
quirement, that fail to recognize the nature of child sexual abuse. The
Washington statute protects the defendant by requiring the court to conduct
its reliability hearing outside the presence of the jury.1 ° 7 The purpose of the
reliability hearing is to avoid the "potential prejudicial effects of foundation
testimony," which usually is introduced prior to the hearsay statement or
prior to the objection to the hearsay statement.' 0 8 The Indiana and Minne-
sota hearsay exception statutes are substantially similar to the Washington
statute. 109
The Colorado statute provides instructions to the jury that it is the jury's
function to assess the weight, credibility, and reliability of the child's state-
ments. 11 o Utah's statute does not require an admissibility hearing per se, but
does state that the judge shall determine whether the statement's admission
will best serve the interest of justice."1
The Indiana statute outlines three categories of unavailability excusing a
child from testifying at the trial.11 2 Unavailability, under the Indiana stat-
ute, may be established by: (1) a psychiatrist's determination that participa-
tion in the trial would be a traumatic experience for the child; (2) a
physician's certification that the child cannot participate for medical rea-
sons; or (3) a court determination that the child is incapable of understand-
104. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120(1) (Supp. 1985); see Comment, A Comprehen-
sive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745,
1763-65 (1983) (characterizing the Washington statutory exception as the "solution" to the
confusion surrounding children's hearsay statements).
105. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120(1) (Supp. 1985); see Comment, supra note 104,
at 1764; see also supra notes 13 and 93 and accompanying text.
106. Comment, supra note 104, at 1765.
107. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120(1) (Supp. 1985); see Comment, supra note 104,
at 1765.
108. Comment, supra note 104, at 1765.
109. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Bums 1984); MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (Supp. 1985).
110. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129(2) (Supp. 1984).
111. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411(1) (Supp. 1983).
112. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(c)(2)(B) (Bums 1984).
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ing the nature and obligation of an oath. 113 The statute explicitly recognizes
that a child's participation in the trial often can be traumatic. 14 Psychia-
trists have verified this fact.115 While excusing a child's participation for
two valid reasons, Indiana's statute errs in declaring a child witness unavail-
able for failing to understand the "nature and obligation of an oath." The
purpose of requiring testimony under oath is to impress upon the witness the
importance of testifying truthfully." 6 Often the abstract nature of a formal
oath is beyond the conceptual ability of a child." 7 Moreover, in a child
sexual abuse case, a formal oath is unnecessary. The judge can dispense with
the "oath" requirement by examining the child, informally, regarding her
understanding of the importance of telling the truth, and the consequences
of lying."' Therefore, the Indiana statute's definition of unavailability is too
broad. By rendering a child unavailable to testify because she does not un-
derstand an oath,' 9 the statute improperly implies that the child's account
of the assault may not be trustworthy.
In contrast to the somewhat strict reliability requirements of the Washing-
ton, Colorado, Utah, Indiana, and Minnesota statutes, the Kansas statute
does not require corroboration of the child's statement if the child is unavail-
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice
System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 976 (1969). Libai was an early advocate for the protection of
child sexual abuse victims in the courtroom. He observed that psychiatrists have identified
several aspects of the adversarial system that place a child under mental stress. Id. at 984.
These aspects include the repeated interrogations and cross-examination, the child's facing the
accused again, the official courtroom atmosphere, the possible acquittal of the defendant based
on the lack of corroborating evidence, and the possible conviction of an abuser who is the
child's parent or relative. Id.: see Melton, Child Witness and the First Amendment.- A
Psycholegal Dilemma, 40 J. OF Soc. ISSUES 109, 109-10 (1984) ("It is typically argued that the
process of investigation and trial results in an exacerbation of psychological trauma and em-
barrassment. . . . This emotional fallout of the legal process may be heightened by the re-
quirement of testimony in open court .... "); Stevens & Berliner, Special Techniques for
Child Witnesses 4 (on file at the Center for Women Policy Studies, Wash., D.C.) (discussing
the trauma in-court testimony presents for child witnesses).
116. See Annot. 81 A.L.R.2d 386, 392-96 (1962).
117. Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan, Competency of Children as Witnesses, in A.B.A., NAT'L
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
& THE LAW 125, 128 (1983).
118. See, e.g., State v. Bowie, 119 Ariz. 336, 580 P.2d 1190 (1978) ("[W]here a child wit-
ness understands the difference between truth and falsehood and understands that he must tell
the truth at trial," the Bowie court stated, "it is of no consequence that the child did not
comprehend 'oath.'" Id. at 342, 580 P.2d at 1196.); see also Miller v. State, 391 So. 2d 1102
(Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (four-year-old girl only eyewitness in sodomy case; three and one-half
pages of the record reflect the direct and redirect examination of the girl as to her understand-
ing of the difference between truth and lies).
119. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(c)(2)(B) (Bums 1984).
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able to testify. 2 0 The Kansas statute merely requires the judge to determine
that the statement is "apparently reliable and the child was not induced to
make the statement falsely by the use of threats or promises. ' 21 This stan-
dard of inquiry is less searching than the standard used in the previously
discussed statutes. The trial judge must instruct the jury that it is its respon-
sibility to address the weight and credibility to be given to the statement.
22
B. Videotape Depositions of Child Sexual Abuse Victims
Ten states recently have enacted statutes allowing for videotape deposi-
tions of child victims of sexual offenses.' 2 3 Ordinarily, a deposition is taken
"whenever due to exceptional circumstances it is in the interests of justice"
to preserve the testimony of a witness.' 24  Several state legislatures have
cited the trauma a child suffers in testifying in a courtroom as a reason why
the protective statutes were enacted. 25 The courtroom experience subjects a
120. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd)(2) (1983).
121. Id.
122. McNeil, The Admissibility of Child Victim Hearsay in Kansas: A Defense Perspective,
23 WASHBURN L.J. 265 (1984). McNeil reviews the Kansas child hearsay statute and high-
lights its inadequacy by discussing the fact that it does not require that the child's statement be
made before the commencement of the action pertaining to the statement. Id. McNeil also
argues that the new statute's treatment of child victim hearsay as inherently reliable is without
regard to "earlier and longstanding reservations surrounding such evidence." Id. at 285.
123. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1984);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.17 (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1984-
1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-401 to -403 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(b) (West
1984). Kentucky and Texas have enacted somewhat similar statutes. Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 421.350 (1984); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1983). The Ken-
tucky and Texas statutes will not be addressed by this Comment because those statutes only
contemplate the use of a child-placement specialist to conduct a videotaped interview of the
child with neither the defendant nor the lawyers for either side present. This interview is then
admissible as testimony as long as the child is available to testify. The Texas child videotape
statute was upheld by an intermediate appellate court in Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984).
124. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a), 18 U.S.C. § 3503(a) (1982); see also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-
2035 (Supp. 1985). The Arkansas statute defines "videotaped deposition" thus:
'Videotaped deposition' means the visual recording on a magnetic tape, together with
the associated sound, of a witness testifying under oath in the course of a judicial
proceeding, upon oral examination and where an opportunity is given for cross-ex-
amination in the presence of the defendant and intended to be played back upon the
trial of the action in court.
Id.
125. See notes accompanying ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1983) (General Assem-
bly stated that the purpose of the Act was "to protect the minor victim from the trauma of
testifying in open court"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.90 (West Supp. 1985) (court may order
videotaping in lieu of trial testimony if "there is a substantial likelihood that a victim or wit-
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child to questioning, in front of strangers, about intimate details of a little
understood sexual act. The child must face these people as she sits alone in
an adult-sized witness chair, with little comprehension of the formalities and
procedures going on about her. In addition, even the prosecutor, who often
has established a rappqrt with the child witness, finds it difficult to transfer
the rapport to the trial setting because, once in the courtroom, he seems
compelled to revert to legal terminology.
126
State statutes allowing videotape depositions of children have, in most
cases, preserved the defendant's rights. A deposition videotaped under these
statutes may be used in trial as substantive evidence only if the prospective
witness is "unavailable" to testify at trial. While state evidence rules vary in
defining "unavailability" for purposes of admitting depositions, approxi-
mately half the states allow the use of depositions in place of live testimony
when a witness suffers from physical or mental infirmity. 127 Several state
videotape statutes expand on the traditional methods of defining "mental
infirmity" for purposes of unavailability. For example, the Maine statute
refers to the "emotional or psychological well-being" of a minor child,' 28
and the New Mexico rule of evidence permits the child to forgo testifying if
the child would suffer "unreasonable and unnecessary mental or emotional
harm."129
Although the videotape statutes are similar in expanding the meaning of
unavailability, they differ in classifying the videotape deposition as either an
additional hearsay exception or as former testimony.13 o Under most of the
ness who is under the age of 16 would suffer severe emotional or mental distress if he were
required to testify in open court"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984); N.M.R. CRIM. P.
DIST. CTs. 29.1 (committee commentary indicates that "[t]he purpose of 30-9-17 ... is to
protect a child who has been allegedly sexually abused from further mental stress"); see also S.
Con. Res. 120, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984):
(2) ...states should consider and enact laws which contain innovative approaches
to the handling of child sexual abuse cases, which protect the victim's legal rights,
including-
(F) establishing procedures for the videotaping of victims' statements and
testimony.
S. Con. Res. 120, supra; see also Goodman & Michelli, Would You Believe a Child Witness,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY Nov. 1981, at 83, 93 (1981).
126. Stevens & Berliner, supra note 115, at 5.
127. Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Perpetrator?, 17
NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 684 & n.204 (1982).
128. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(1) (Supp. 1984-1985).
129. N.M.R. CRIM. P. DIST. CTS. 29.1(b)(2).
130. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346(d) (West Supp. 1985) (former testimony); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 13-25-129, 18-3-411(3) (Supp. 1984) (former testimony); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17
(1984); N.M.R. CRIM. P. DIST. CTS. 29.1(b) (deposition is "additional exception to the hear-
say rule of the Rules of Evidence").
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videotape statutes, a trial judge must preside. 131 In addition, the defendant
must receive reasonable notice in advance of the taping so that he may ade-
quately prepare for the cross-examination of the child, which will be in-
cluded on the videotape. 132 Such notice apprises the defendant and his
counsel that the deposition is, or probably will be, the defendant's only op-
portunity to cross-examine the child. The Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, as well as the Maine, Arkansas, and South Dakota statutes, expressly
allow for the cross-examination of the child at the deposition to be of the
same scope and manner that would be allowed if the child were to testify in
the courtroom at trial.
1 33
C. Judicial Response to the Existing Statutory Innovations
As a result of their recent enactment, there has been little case law inter-
preting these statutes. In State v. Slider,1 34 the Court of Appeals of Wash-
ington, by affirming a defendant's conviction for the statutory rape of a
toddler for whom he was baby-sitting 135 had its first opportunity to rule on
Washington's new statute. Under the statutory excited utterance exception,
the trial judge admitted the child victim's statements to her mother.136 The
court of appeals, however, determined that the aggregate effect of the time
delay and the leading nature of the mother's questions weakened the state-
ments made by Trina, the child victim, beyond the degree of reliability con-
templated by the excited utterance exception. 137 Accordingly, the court
ruled that the trial judge improperly admitted the hearsay declaration under
the excited utterance exception.
138
The court of appeals then analyzed the statement under the requirements
of the "broader" statutory child sexual abuse exception.' 39 Finding "partic-
ularized guarantees of trustworthiness" among such factors as the time, con-
tent, and circumstances of the declaration, corroborative evidence of the
abuse, and the defendant's confession,'" the court held that the trial court
would not have abused its discretion by admitting the declaration under this
131. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2312 (1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17.A
(1984).
132. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17.A (1984).
133. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2036 (Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1205(2) (Supp. 1984-1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (Supp.
1984).
134. 688 P.2d 538 (Wash. App. 1984).
135. Id. at 540.
136. Id. at 544.
137. Id. at 541.
138. Id.
139. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1985).
140. 688 P.2d at 540.
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new exception.1 1  The court found the victim "unavailable" because she
showed, at the pretrial hearing, that she lacked any memory of the event,
excluding the fact that the defendant had been her baby sitter. 142 The court
also addressed the defendant's contention that his right to confront the wit-
nesses against him had been denied.'4 3 Beginning with the premise that a
defendant's right to confront witnesses is not absolute,'" the court under-
took the Ohio v. Roberts 45 sixth amendment confrontation clause analysis of
'the witness' unavailability and the statement's particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. The court concluded that the defendant's confrontation
right had not been "contravened to an unconstitutional degree.
'' 6
The Florida District Court of Appeals ruled on Florida's child videotape
deposition statute in Washington v. State.'4 7 Paul Washington was con-
victed of sexual battery and attempted lewd assault on an eleven-year-old
child. Appealing this conviction, he raised the issue of trial court error in
allowing videotaped testimony by the victim.' 48 Washington argued that
before a court admits videotape testimony by a child victim, an expert must
establish the necessity of videotaping the child's testimony under section
918.17 of the Florida law.' 4 9 Rejecting Washington's argument, the court
held that because there was evidence that the child victim was under "a
severe emotional strain," it was within the trial judge's discretion to permit
the videotaping.'
As prosecutors increasingly bring child sexual abuse cases to trial, the
novel expansion of the hearsay exception in these cases and the ever-increas-
ing use of the videotape deposition sanctioned under state statute no doubt
will come under more searching constitutional scrutiny as more and tougher
challenges to these devices are mounted by defendants.
141. Id. at 544.
142. Id. at 541.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 542.
145. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The Supreme Court summarized its holding:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confron-
tation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his
statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Reliability can
be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Id. at 66.
146. 688 P.2d at 544.
147. 452 So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
148. Id. at 83.
149. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.17 (West Supp. 1984). This section of Florida's statutes has
been renumbered as FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.90 (West Supp. 1985).
150. Washington, 452 So. 2d at 83.
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III. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND VIDEOTAPE DEPOSITIONS IN CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES: STRENGTHENING PROTECTION FOR
THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. The Accused's Sixth Amendment Rights and Child Sexual Abuse
Hearsay Exceptions
The sixth amendment guarantees that the accused in a criminal prosecu-
tion "shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him . *...""51 Professor McCormick has stated that the purpose of the
American right to confrontation is "to guarantee the maintenance in crimi-
nal cases of the hard-won principle of the hearsay rule . . .,,""' This ra-
tionale, however, has not rendered all hearsay inadmissible under the sixth
amendment.1 53 Hearsay statements must undergo an analysis outlined by
the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts'54 and California v.
Green. If the declarant, a child victim, testifies at trial, the admissibility
of her hearsay statements does not present a constitutional issue as long as
the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the child about those
statements.15 6 If the prosecutor does not wish to call the child as a witness,
but nevertheless seeks to introduce the child's hearsay statements, he must
demonstrate that the child declarant is unavailable to testify, in accord with
the requirements of the Federal Rules or the statutory hearsay exceptions for
child sexual abuse cases.
157
The Utah hearsay exception for child sexual abuse cases, for example,
does not specifically require the child to be legally unavailable for her out-of-
court statement to be considered admissible. The Utah rule simply states
that such statements are admissible "in the event the child does not testify,
[and] there is other corroborative evidence of the abuse."' 58 Although there
has been no judicial interpretation of the clause "in the event the child does
not testify," it should be interpreted to require legal unavailability under the
Utah rules of evidence to prevent unnecessary use of the statute by child
witnesses who are capable of testifying. Moreover, state rules of evidence
should be amended to specify that emotional and psychological trauma
151. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1965)).
152. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 33, § 249, at 750.
153. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965).
154. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
155. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
156. Id. at 158.
157. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 66.
158. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411(2) (Supp. 1983).
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preventing children from testifying in court is a form of medical unavailabil-
ity reflecting the heavy toll a courtroom appearance exacts from a child.
After a satisfactory demonstration of unavailability by the prosecutor
through the use of medical or psychological expert testimony or by a trial
judge through discretionary determination, the judge still must find that the
child's statements contain adequate "indicia of reliability."'1 59 If the child's
statements fall within a "firmly-rooted" exception to the hearsay rule,'
60
such as the excited utterance exception, adequate indicia of reliability are
inferred without more proof.
1 61
Because the child sexual abuse hearsay exceptions have been enacted re-
cently, and therefore are not "firmly-rooted," the child's statements must
show "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."1 62 If the child is un-
available to testify, the statutory exceptions require corroboration of the act
in question and judicial determination of admissibility.' 63 Corroboration of
the sexual assault is often difficult to obtain due to the nature of the crime. 164
A physical examination of the child by a physician after the assault may
provide the required corroboration. Any evidence discovered through such
an examination constitutes sufficient corroboration if it is consistent with the
child's hearsay statement. 6  The fact that only the accused had an opportu-
nity to commit the offense, within the time period and under the circum-
stances described by the child, also may provide corroboration.'
66
The recently enacted child sexual abuse exceptions provide sufficient par-
ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness to meet constitutional scrutiny.
Many states still rely on the excited utterance exception to admit a child
victim's hearsay statements even when the presence of spontaneity, the es-
sence of the excited utterance, is questionable. 167 The new statutes remove
the need for strong reliance on spontaneity and instead allow the judge to
consider and to weigh various factors indicative of reliability. The trustwor-
159. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Bums 1984).
160. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 66.
161. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 33, § 249, at 732.
162. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
163. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411
(Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1985).
164. See Comment, supra note 104, at 1749-51.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979) (physician testi-
fied as to results of examination of child that indicated penetration of the child's rectum).
Because most sexual abuse is predominantly nonviolent, there is usually little physical evi-
dence. Comment, supra note 104, at 1750. "Most crimes consist of petting, exhibitionism,
fondling, and oral copulation, activities that do not involve forceful physical contact." Id.
166. See Peterson, Sexual Abuse of Children- Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58
WASH. L. REV. 813, 828 (1983).
167. See supra notes 77, 85 and accompanying text.
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thiness of a child's out-of-court declarations can be ensured by judicial use of
these factors in determining admissibility. The courts should ensure the
gradual acceptance of the new exceptions by carefully scrutinizing proffered
declarations. In addition, courts should not abuse the new statutory excep-
tions. Where possible, courts should fit the child victim's out-of-court decla-
rations into one of the "traditional" exceptions to the hearsay rule.
B. Cross-Examination and Videotape Depositions
The videotaped testimony of a child witness introduced at trial in lieu of
in-court testimony may be challenged by a defendant under the sixth amend-
ment confrontation clause. The United States Supreme Court in California
v. Green 168 held that the confrontation clause was not violated by admitting
the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness where the witness, at the pre-
liminary hearing, was under oath, the defendant was represented by counsel,
and there was full opportunity for cross-examination.1 69  In Ohio v. Rob-
erts,'7° the United States Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of the
transcript of a witness' preliminary hearing testimony where the witness was
not present at the trial. The court concluded that good-faith efforts to locate
the witness determine the unavailability of the witness. The burden is on the
prosecution to establish these efforts."'7 Once unavailability is established, it
is proper for the court to admit the declarant's cross-examined preliminary
hearing testimony.' 72
The purposes served by the sixth amendment confrontation clause were
168. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
169. The witness in Green, 16-year-old Melvin Porter, was available to testify at trial de-
spite being "markedly evasive and uncooperative on the stand." Id. at 151-52. Porter claimed
an inability to remember many of the events that were the subject of his testimony. Id. at 152.
The Court stated that if the witness had died "or was otherwise unavailable" to testify at trial,
the confrontation clause still would not have been violated by admitting Porter's preliminary
hearing testimony for two reasons. Id. at 166. First, the right of cross-examination available
to the defendant and his counsel at the preliminary hearing provided "substantial compliance"
with the purposes of the confrontation clause. Id. Further, the declarant's unavailability at
trial was not "in any way the fault of the State." Id.
170. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
171. Id. at 74-75.
172. Because the defense counsel in Roberts did not necessarily have reason to believe that
Anita Isaac, the witness, would be unavailable at trial, the court examined the extent of coun-
sel's questioning at the hearing to determine whether it satisfied the confrontation clause. Id.
at 70-71. The Court noted that the defense counsel, at the hearing, asked leading questions, a
significant component of cross-examination. Id. The Court concluded that the questioning
was consistent with the principal purpose of cross-examination. Id. That purpose, the Court
stated, is to challenge "whether the declarant was sincerely telling what he believed to be the
truth, whether the declarant accurately perceived and remembered the matter he related, and
whether the declarant's intended meaning is adequately conveyed by the language he em-
ployed." Id. at 71 (quoting Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Ex-
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summarized by the Supreme Court in California v. Green.173 The three prin-
cipal functions of confrontation, the Court stated, are: (1) to ensure that the
witness testifies under oath; (2) to ensure that the witness undergoes cross-
examination; and (3) to allow the jury to assess the credibility of the witness
by observing the witness' demeanor as he testifies. 174 Videotape depositions
that grant the defendant the right to full cross-examination at the deposition
fulfill these purposes.
Requiring the witness to testify under oath, the first purpose of confronta-
tion, is designed to impress upon the witness the importance of testifying
truthfully. 175 The use of a formal oath for child witnesses does not necessar-
ily ensure greater truthfulness, especially when the child may be instructed
merely to recite the oath as requested without any explanation of its mean-
ing. 17  Informally, the judge can examine the child regarding her under-
standing of the importance of telling the truth and the consequences of not
doing so. Under the statutes not providing for a presiding judge at the depo-
sition, counsel for either party or both the state and the accused can question
the child regarding her competency.
The second and most important function of confrontation is to permit the
accused the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.177 A videotape depo-
sition allows the accused to prepare to cross-examine the child as if at trial
because the accused is on notice that the videotape may, and probably will,
replace in-court testimony by the child. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
15 allows broad cross-examination, to the extent allowed at a trial.
17 8
Two cases have discussed the defendant's rights to be physically present at
the deposition and to cross-examine the witness. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held in United States v. Benfield179 that the
confrontation clause requires active participation by the defendant if he so
ception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1378
(1972)).
173. 399 U.S. at 158.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
177. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 at 32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (cross-examina-
tion "is beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
178. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(d). But see C. MCCORMICK, supra note 33, § 255, at 762. At a
preliminary hearing, "an argument can be made that strategy often dictates little or no cross-
examination at that stage, since ample opportunity will be afforded at trial." Id. California's
child videotape deposition statute prescribes that the deposition be taken at the preliminary
hearing. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1985); see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-12-9 (Supp. 1984) (child's testimony videotaped at preliminary hearing, but statute spe-
cifically requires that cross-examination shall be of the scope and manner allowed at trial).
179. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
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requests.180 The Indiana Supreme Court, however, in Jones v. State,"' held
that a defendant's rights were not abridged in a state proceeding where he
was refused permission to attend a deposition at which his counsel cross-
examined the witnesses." 2
In United States v. Benfield, 8 3 the defendant was convicted in federal dis-
trict court of misprision of a felony relating to a kidnapping.' 84 At a hearing
held to determine if the government's request to take a videotape deposition
of the witness was proper, her psychiatrist stated that either the victim
should not testify or "circumstances less stressful than a trial courtroom
[should] be arranged."' 8 5 The trial court granted the deposition request and
allowed Benfield to be present at the deposition "but not within the vision of
[the witness]."' 8 6 The videotape of the deposition was admitted into evi-
dence at trial.' 87 The court of appeals relied on rule 15 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure which ensures the right of the defendant to be present
at the deposition. In addition to her right to be present, the court concluded
that Benfield had a right to confront the witness under the sixth amendment.
Confrontation requires a "face-to-face" meeting as well as cross-examina-
tion, the court concluded.' 8 The court explained that the importance of a
face-to-face confrontation is that "in some undefined but real way recollec-
tion, veracity, and communications are influenced." '89
180. Id. at 821.
181. 445 N.E.2d 98 (1983).
182. Id. at 99-100.
183. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
184. One of the government witnesses, the kidnapping victim, was unavailable on two trial
dates due to the witness' hospitalization. The victim witness' psychiatrist wrote to the trial
court, stating that the witness "should not be required to endure a trial situation or face Ben-
field," the defendant. Id. at 817.
185. Id. The victim witness' infirmity began several months after the kidnapping and grad-
ually worsened until she could "no longer tolerate crowd situations and was unable to work."
Id. at 817 n.3.
186. Id. at 817. When the deposition was taken, Benfield was excluded from the room in
which it was conducted. Id. He was able, however, to observe the proceedings on a monitor
and halt the questioning by sounding a buzzer that signaled a request to confer with his law-
yer. Id. Benfield's counsel cross-examined the witness but the witness was "apparently kept
unaware of Benfield's presence in the building." Id.
187. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit commented on the
government's "marginal" showing of the witness' unavailability at trial. The government re-
lied on the evidence of her condition at the hearing on the request for a videotape without
presenting evidence of her condition on the day of trial. The court did not specifically indicate
that unavailability on the trial date must also be shown, although the court stated that it
"would have been a much better practice." Id. at 817 n.4.
188. Id. at 821. "The right of cross-examination reinforces the importance of physical
confrontation." Id.
189. Id. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), prior trial testimony of two
witnesses was admitted at the second trial because the witnesses were deceased. The Supreme
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The court stated that a deposition necessarily eliminates a face-to-face
meeting between the witness and the jury, and it could not find justification
for "further abridgement of the defendant's rights" by excluding him from
the deposition. 0 Although a videotape deposition "supplies an environ-
ment substantially comparable to a trial," the court stated, this procedural
substitute did not pass constitutional muster because the defendant was not
allowed to participate actively. 9 ' The partial confrontation allowed at the
deposition was not sufficient, the court said, to test the accuracy of the wit-
ness' perception of the event or her recollection or expression of those
events. 192
In contrast, the Indiana Supreme Court in Jones v. State93 affirmed a
defendant's conviction for child molestation even though the defendant was
refused the right to be present at the prosecution's taking of depositions.194
Denying that the defendant's right of confrontation had been abridged, the
court relied on the fact that the deposed witnesses testified in open court,
thus enabling the defendant to confront and cross-examine them at that
time. 95
The third purpose of the confrontation clause is to enable the jury to ob-
serve the demeanor of the witness. A videotape deposition, by its very na-
ture, is uniquely qualified to present the demeanor of the child as she gives
her statement and is cross-examined by opposing counsel. By viewing the
Court recognized a sixth amendment confrontation issue but held that the "substance of the
constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of
seeing the witness face to face .... " Id. at 244.
190. 593 F.2d at 821. A defendant may lose his right to be present at trial, or presumably
at a deposition, if his conduct is disruptive and disrespectful toward the court so that the trial
cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970).
In Benfield, the right of confrontation was curtailed by the procedures employed in the taking
of the deposition. Curtailment of a defendant's right of confrontation that is constitutionally
permissible depends on the facts of the case, including defendant's conduct. 593 F.2d at 821.
191. 593 F.2d at 821. In addition, the court stated that its decision should not be regarded
as "prohibiting the development of electronic video technology in litigation. Where the parties
agree to a given procedure or where [it] more nearly approximates the traditional courtroom
setting, our approval might be forthcoming." Id.
192. Id. at 822; see Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850
(1981). In Herbert, the defendant was charged with sexual offenses against a five-year-old
child, who was the only inculpatory witness against the defendant. Without the defendant's
consent, the physical arrangements of the courtroom were changed so that the defendant and
the child could not see each other while the child testified at the preliminary hearing. Id. at
664-65, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 851. It was held that the trial court denied defendant his right of
confrontation as well as an effective method for determining veracity. Id. at 671, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 855.
193. 445 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1983).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 100.
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videotape as opposed to reading a transcript of the child's testimony, the
jury is better able to assess the child's credibility.' 96 Because the child often
is less upset, frightened, shy, or humiliated in the more informal deposition
proceeding, the jury has a more accurate and less emotional view of the
child.
The three aspects of the confrontation clause considered above are pre-
served by the videotape deposition in which the defendant participates and is
present in the room in which the proceedings take place.
IV. THE NEED FOR SPECIAL CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
EVIDENTIARY INNOVATIONS
A child sexual abuse victim's statements traditionally have been admitted
into evidence under the excited utterance exception.197 Often the child vic-
tim's statements do not fit easily into this already carved-out exception. 9
The reasons for this vary, but center most often on the age of the child and
her corresponding behavioral and intellectual growth. An older child, in her
early teens, is more apt immediately to react by reporting an assault. 99 A
younger child, abused by a trusted adult such as a parent, stepparent, or
babysitter, may react in many different ways but usually not by reporting the
abuse spontaneously to someone. 200 In many cases, the person to whom she
ordinarily would report or relate something of importance is the very person
who is abusing her. The use of expert testimony to explain the "dynamics of
child sexual abuse" is useful to both the judge and the jury in that it can
provide a "richer context within which to interpret the child's testimony."
20'
196. See, e.g., Hutchins v. State, 286 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). One
commentator has explained this fact as follows:
The tape can detect whether the child's narration was hurried or deliberate, angry or
satisfied, calm or excited. Spontaneous statements can easily be distinguished from
responses to leading questions, and hesitant voices can be identified and compared
with confident ones. The tape reveals whether the child is decisive or ambiguous
.... Furthermore, a written statement does not convey the child victim's original
story as authentically as a taped conversation.
Libai, supra note 27, at 990 (footnotes omitted).
197. See supra notes 35, 36 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 32-100 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 15.
200. Expert testimony on the dynamics of child sexual abuse is used in some jurisdictions
to rebut defense contentions that the child did not report an incident immediately because she
is lying. Expert testimony can explain "typical child reactions to sexual abuse, including cer-
tain symptoms characteristic of posttraumatic stress in such cases: disturbances in physical
and cognitive functioning, re-experiencing the traumatic event, withdrawal from usual and
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A statement admitted under a Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2)-type ex-
ception is considered reliable because the spontaneity of the statement-
made during a startling event-acts to still the normal reflective thought
process of the declarant.2 °2 This reasoning does not usually apply to state-
ments made by children. Children do not always react with shock, revul-
sion, or immediate excitement or disgust within moments after a sexual
assault. 20 3 It has been asserted that children's reactions "can run the entire
gamut of behaviors in response to a sexual assault, ranging from the negative
to the positive., 2 1 In sum, the stress and excitement required by rule 803(2)
do not correlate with many children's responses to sexual assaults.
The spontaneity additionally required under rule 803(2) has caused diffi-
culties for the courts in assessing when the lapse in time between the assault
and the child's statement is too long. A victim's fear caused by threats from
the abuser often results in a substantial delay before the victim relates the
story to anyone. 20 5 This delay erodes the safeguard of spontaneity inherent
in a rule 803(2)-type exception and undermines the trustworthiness of the
exception.
Children's hearsay statements can be and, in many instances, are reliable.
To trust only spontaneous statements made by children is to ignore other
signs of reliability within the statement itself and the surrounding circum-
stances. The newly enacted state hearsay exceptions for child witnesses rec-
ognize the need for special judicial scrutiny of the statements of a child who
has been sexually abused. 20 6 The judge is not required to base his decision as
to admissibility solely on time and spontaneity factors. He is allowed to look
to a wider realm of circumstances peculiar to the testing of the reliability of a
child's statement.
Videotape depositions, while a more technical innovation than an excep-
202. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 33, § 297, at 854.
203. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 104, at 1756 & nn.92-94; see also Brown v. United
States, 152 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1945). In Brown, a three-year-old girl related a story of an
"alleged act of indecent character" that took place at her nursery school while telling her
mother the events of the day. 152 F.2d at 138. The appeals court overruled the statement's
admissibility under the excited utterance exception because it was merely a "calm narrative."
Id. at 139.
204. Burgess, supra note 1, at 135.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980) (delay in making
statement after assault of between 45 minutes and 1 hour 15 minutes), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1001 (1981); State v. Ritchey, 107 Ariz. 552, 490 P.2d 558 (1971) (delay in reporting assault of
45 minutes).
206. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1984). This statute requires the judge
to instruct the jury that the various factors they must consider are the age and maturity of the
child, the nature of the child's statement, the circumstances under which the statement was
made, and any other relevant factor. Id. This instruction provides the jury with relevant
criteria that the jurors, without the instruction, might not take into consideration.
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tion to the hearsay rule, are nonetheless reliable and trustworthy as well as
protective of the defendant's rights. An important question for a prosecutor
is whether a videotape deposition should be used instead of the child hearsay
exception. If a child has not made any relevant, useful hearsay statements, a
videotape deposition may be necessary. The use of a deposition in lieu of in-
court testimony also depends upon the ability of the child to be an effective
witness. The child should be able to recall and relate facts to the cameras
and thus to the jury in a manner that will convey information.2"7
A child's inability to relate the facts of a sexual encounter before the jury
in a crowded courtroom is not unusual. In addition, a trial may finally occur
months or even a year or two after the alleged assault.208 A child's memory
will fade more quickly than an adult's and in many cases the adults involved
in the case can begin to suggest ideas that are implanted into the child's
version of the event. 20 9 For these reasons, a prosecutor might wish to pres-
ent a videotape deposition. Under some statutes, the deposition may be
taken as soon as the state decides to prosecute.210 A videotape deposition
should take place in the judge's chambers or a conference-type room. Be-
cause the defendant will be present, the child should be accompanied by a
guardian, probably a parent, to lessen her fear. If the state permits the intro-
duction of a videotape deposition in lieu of in-court testimony, the child will
have to testify only once, and the testimony will be taken as soon after the
assault as possible. The more quickly the child victim is relieved of her re-
sponsibilities imposed by the criminal justice system, the sooner the child
may begin to overcome the emotional problems created by the assault.
The defendant's constitutional rights are protected by these evidentiary
207. Federal Rule of Evidence 601 raises a presumption of competency for each witness.
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 33, § 62, at 156:
The major reason for disqualification of [a child] . . . is the judge's distrust of a
jury's ability to assay the words of a small child. . . . Conceding the jury's deficien-
cies, the remedy of excluding such a witness, who may be the only person available
who knows the facts, seems inept and primitive.
id.
208. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
209. See Bernstein, supra note 26, at 14; Meyers, supra note 7, at 51 (often an incident is
discussed with, or in the presence of, the child by parents, siblings, neighbors, or other chil-
dren). "What really matters when dealing with children as witnesses, insisted (a defense attor-
ney), is who they have talked to before the trial, such as psychologists, parents, teachers,
police, etc. 'I hate to use the word "contamination," but that is a big danger,' he said." Kiddie
Power in Court: Children on the Witness Stand, Chi. Trib., Feb. 20, 1983, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
210. The child should of course testify in a deposition proceeding or at trial if the testimony
will "substantially increase the chance of a conviction and will not do serious harm to the
child." Berliner & Barbieri, supra note 1, at 134. Even if the child can give some sort of
statement, there may be so little chance of conviction that the child should not be forced to
endure the stress of the proceedings. Id.
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innovations. The accused is assured that the court can only admit hearsay
statements that show particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. In a
videotape deposition of a child victim, the accused is accorded the same
right to confront and cross-examine the witness that he has at trial.2 ' In
short, there is no abrogation of the defendant's rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Child sexual abuse is no longer a hidden crime in American society. The
reported cases are too numerous. Child offenders and juvenile delinquents
have long been protected by special juvenile courts and proceedings and this
special protection should also be accorded to child victims of sexual abuse.
Legislative acknowledgement of the trauma experienced by children in testi-
fying, which is inflicted so often by the current criminal justice system, is a
significant step towards the protection of child victims.
The public outcry at the reports of the trauma suffered by child victims in
sexual abuse cases will prompt more protective legislation. Challenges to the
constitutionality of the legislative reforms will continue to grow as more
convictions are achieved with the aid of the legislative innovations. Chal-
lenges to the new hearsay and deposition statutes should be rejected. They
are constitutionally sound means of shielding the child victim from the rig-
ors of courtroom testimony. Most importantly, the new statutes aid in the
prosecution of child molesters and abusers by providing the court with the
statements of the only witnesses to the event.
Jean L Kelly
211. See, e.g., N.M.R. CRIM. P. DisT. Cr. 29.1(a), (b).
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